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Pennsylvania's Assessment Laws Permitting the
Use of a Base Year Method in Property Taxation
Are Not Facially Unconstitutional, but Are
Unconstitutionally Non-Uniform as Applied in
Allegheny County: Clifton v. Allegheny County
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION-UNIFORMITY CLAUSE-PROPERTY
TAX-PENNSYLVANiA ASSESSMENT LAWS-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that Allegheny County's base year method of
assessment for property tax purposes was unconstitutional as ap-
plied because the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution requires that substantially proportionate taxing burdens be
placed upon similarly classified properties within the same taxing
district.
Clifton v. Allegheny County, 969 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2009).
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1. THE FACTS OF CLIFTON
Pennsylvania's assessment laws do not call for, nor do they for-
bid, periodic property reassessments.' Despite its long history as
the chief tax, property taxes have been supplanted by income and
excise taxes, though it remains a key source of funding for various
1. Clifton v. Allegheny County, 969 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 2009). Pennsylvania's as-
sessment laws include the General County Assessment Law, 72 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5020-1
to -602 (2009); the First Class County Assessment Law, §§ 5341.1-.21; the Second Class
County Assessment Law, §§ 5452.1-.20; the Second Class A and Third Class County As-
sessment Law, §§ 5342-5350k; and the Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law, §§
5453. 10 1-. 107.
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public services. 2 Under Pennsylvania's assessment laws, in order
to obtain a property's value for taxing purposes, a county performs
an assessment which must be uniform as to all properties within
the county.3
Pennsylvania's assessment laws have not always been silent re-
garding periodic reassessments; in fact, before 1982 the laws
mandated that each county perform annual assessments based
upon real property's actual value.4 Under these laws, Allegheny
County, for reasons not mentioned, was permitted to conduct as-
sessments every three years. 5 The laws requiring annual assess-
ments were not adhered to by the majority of the Commonwealth's
counties and the laws were subsequently amended to permit coun-
ties to use current market values or a base year method for de-
termining the assessed value of the properties within their juris-
dictions. 6 When a county chooses the base year method of valuing
properties it reassesses all properties in a given year, the "base
year," and then uses the assessed values to determine the proper-
ties' taxation in the base year and following years. 7 Such a me-
thod does not, however, take into consideration value changes af-
ter the base year; thus, a property's actual value may fluctuate
while its assessed value remains rigid.8
2. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1201-02.
3. Id. at 1202-03. An assessment is based upon a property's actual fair market value,
i.e., "the price a purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner, willing but
not obliged to sell, considering all uses to which the property is adapted and might reason-
ably be applied." Id. at 1203 n.5 (quoting Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. Chester County
Bd. of Assessment, 913 A.2d 194, 196 n.2 (Pa. 2006)). The "assessed value" is "[tihe value
of an asset as determined by an appraiser for tax purposes." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1691 (9th ed. 2009). The ratio of assessed value to actual market value must be uniform as
to all properties within a county, pursuant to the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1202-03 (citing PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). For a discus-
sion of what "uniform" means, see infra p. 656.
4. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1203.
5. Id.
6. Id. "Base year" means:
the year upon which real property market values are based for the most recent coun-
ty-wide revision of assessment of real property, or other prior year upon which the
market value of all real property of the county is based. Real property market values
shall be equalized within the county and any changes by the board of revision of tax-
es or board for the assessment and revision of taxes shall be expressed in terms of
such base year values.
72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5020-102.
7. Clifton. 969 A.2d at 1203 (citing Downingtown, 913 A.2d at 202-03).
8. Id. There are ways that a property's assessed value can change even without a
countywide reassessment, e.g., if a structure is built on a parcel that was vacant in the base
year the county board of assessors will alter the value of the property accordingly, though
the new assessed value must be equivalent to what the property's assessed value would
Vol. 48652
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Prior to Clifton, Allegheny County had been sued for its assess-
ment methods several times. 9 Allegheny County utilized a base
year method for valuating assessments in 2002.10 Before that
time, the County simply based a property's assessed value on its
previous year assessed value and would moderately increase or
decrease the former value depending upon whether the property
was in an area where values were believed to be increasing or de-
creasing." In addition, an ad hoc process of reassessing entire
areas of the county at a time was utilized.' 2
This process was halted in 1996 when the Board of County
Commissioners sought to freeze assessments except for structural
improvements to a property.'3 This resolution was seconded by
the Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and
Review.' 4 The Assessment Board lengthened the freeze to include
the 1997 tax year, with the intent for such to be effective for five
years or until a new assessment was undertaken.' 5 This extended
freeze was deemed impermissible pursuant to the Second Class
County Code in a suit brought by taxpayers in the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas.' 6
After the County became a home-rule body in 2000, a new as-
sessment was used for the 2001 tax year, but numerous lawsuits
were filed charging that the new assessments were void because
they were not properly certified.' 7 About 90,000 taxpayers ap-
pealed their new assessed values.' 8 The County then conducted a
have been in the base year had the improvements already been made. See generally 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5347.1.
9. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1204. See, e.g., Beattie v. Allegheny County, 907 A.2d 519 (Pa.
2006).




14. Id. This resolution provided exceptions for new buildings, construction, improve-
ments, and subdivision. Id. The Assessment Board has the duty to make and supervise
the making of all assessments i the county. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5452.4.
15. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1204.
16. Id. (discussing Miller v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 145 P.L.J. 501
(Ct. Coin. Pl. Allegheny 1997)). The Second Class County Code required annual revisions
of assessments. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101-5106-A (2009). Judge Wettick ordered the
County to update the assessed values for use in the 1998 tax year. Clifton, 969 A.2d at
1204. The County was unable to perform this task, so Judge Wettick modified his order,
whereby the County had to undertake a total countywide assessment by 2000 to be used in
the 2001 tax year. Id. at 1204-05.
17. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1205.
18. Id.
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yearly reassessment to be utilized in the 2002 tax year. 19 Thereaf-
ter, the County's Assessment Ordinance was amended in order
that the 2002 assessment would serve as the base year for 2003,
2004, and 2005.20 New assessments for 2006 were to be estab-
lished and forwarded to property owners who would have an in-
stant right to appeal.21 The chief assessment officer performed a
computer- assisted reassessment, which was verified by the Inter-
national Association of Assessing Officers ("IAAO"), and was to be
used in 2006, but this effort was not officially certified and went
unused. 22
I1. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CLIFTON
In October 2005, the County Council passed Ordinance 45,
which provided for ongoing use of the 2002 assessment.23 The Or-
dinance did not mention a date for a reassessment to be con-
ducted, but it ordered that an expert study the County's assess-
ment system in 2009.24 Two suits disputing Ordinance 45 were
filed, one by appellees Kenneth Pierce and Stephanie Beechaum
(the "Pierce Complaint") and another by appellees James C. Clif-
ton, Charles and Lorrie Cranor, and Roy Simmons and Mary Lisa
Meier (the "Clifton Complaint"). 25 Originally, the appellees' com-
19. Id. This action was pursuant to the assessment ordinance adopted by the newly
formed County Council. Allegheny County Admin. Code § 5-209.10.
20. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1205.
2 1. Id.
22. . The County Council subsequently passed Ordinance 15, allowing the chief as-
sessment officer to ascertain the value of each property, analyze different neighborhoods for
market value increase or decrease, and assign a value limit for each neighborhood-from
decrease to no change, and up to an increase of four percent. Id. Ordinance 15 was held to
violate the County's Home Rule Charter, the Second Class County Charter Law, Pennsyl-
vania assessment laws, and the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but
the 2005 assessment was not certified by the court either. Sto-Rox Sch. Dist. v. Allegheny
County, 153 P.L.J. 193 (Ct. Coin. P1. Allegheny 2005).
23. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1206.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Pierce Complaint included two properties, one in Braddock and another in
the Hill District of Pittsburgh, the values of which were significantly lower (almost fifty
percent) than the 2002 assessed values still in effect at the time of the complaint. Id. The
Clifton Complaint included three properties: one was located in Wexford and purchased in
2004 for $532,000, though its assessed value for 2004 through 2006 was $508,000. Id. The
Wexford property's 2002 assessed value was $425,400. Id. Another property in the Clifton
Complaint was purchased in Pittsburgh in 2003 for $730,000 and was assessed at that
price in 2005 and 2006, though it was assessed at $466,000 in 2002 and 2003. Clifton, 969
A.2d at 1207. The third property in the Clifton Complaint was purchased in Mt. Lebanon
in 2004 for $412,500 and its assessed value for 2005 and 2006 was the purchase price. Id.
The Mt. Lebanon property was assessed at $233,700 in 2002 and 2004. Id. The Clifton
plaintiffs complained that the use of the 2002 base year unfairly benefits property owners
who purchased their homes before 2002. Id. at 1207 n. 14. They complained that since they
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plaints centered upon whether the County was permitted by the
Commonwealth's assessment laws to use 2002 actual values for
the 2006 assessment. 26 The trial court sustained the County's ob-
jections that sought dismissal of the claims that Ordinance 45 vi-
olated state assessment laws.2 7 However, the trial court gave
leave to the appellees to amend their complaints to challenge the
constitutionality of those same assessment laws, where previous-
ly, the appellees had only tangentially mentioned abrogation of
the Uniformity Clause.28
The trial court found the base year method of valuation, as pro-
vided in the state assessment laws, to be facially unconstitutional
because such a process inexorably fosters unduly inequitable re-
sults. 2 9 Judge Wettick held that by not requiring reassessments,
such laws violate the Uniformity Clause because the base year
method does not assign to all properties the same ratio of as-
sessed-to-market-value and thereby naturally causes serious in-
equalities, as well as necessarily prejudicing owners of properties
in lower-value communities. 30 The trial court concluded that the
only option for the County was yearly assessments based on
present market value, but refrained from ordering a reassessment
for the 2008 tax year because of the statewide applicability of its
ruling and because the court desired to give the legislature an op-
portunity to address the problematic system. 31 The County filed a
consolidated direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.32
must appeal their assessed values to have them reduced to the 2002 market value, they are
obligated to "appeal their way to uniformity." Id.
26. Id. at 1207.
27. Id. The trial court found that though the County could not freeze assessments as
found in Miller, 145 P.L.J. 501, it could garner similar results by utilizing a base year me-
thod according to the plain language of the assessment laws. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1207
n.16.
28. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1207. Specifically, the suits averred that Pennsylvania's base
year method violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. The
Uniformity Clause states, "All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects,
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and col-
lected under general laws." PA. CONST. art. VHI, § 1. A nonjury trial was held in December
2006. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1207-08.
29. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1208.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1208-09. In response to this judicial restraint both the County and the tax-
payers filed post-trial motions; the former questioned the order on various bases and the
latter requested an immediate reassessment. Id. at 1209. Both motions were denied and
final judgment was entered. Id.
32. Id. at 1209-10. The jurisdictional statute states:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of
the courts of common pleas in . . . [miatters where the court of common pleas has held
Summer 2010 655
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111. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COUR~T OPINIONS IN CLIFTON
A. Chief Justice Castille's Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began by articulat-
ing the requirements of the Uniformity Clause. 33 Chief Justice
Castille cited precedent instructing that uniformity does not mean
complete equality, but rather that the law requires substantial
uniformity as nearly absolute as workable, given the methods with
which and the entities upon which taxes are imposed.34 He noted
that approximate uniformity with expected practical disparities is
all that is needed in the inexact science of taxation.35
The court stated that the taxpayer's burden in showing a taxing
statute to be unconstitutional is twofold: first, she must show that
the statute produces a classification; and second, that such is un-
reasonable and not rationally related to any legitimate govern-
mental interest. 36 Justice Castille noted that this burden includes
overcoming a correspondingly low level of judicial scrutiny be-
cause of the legislature's considerable discretion and power in the
area of taxation.37 The authority to classify, he reminded, is in-
cluded in the General Assembly's broad powers and will only be
negated by a court if a given classification results in impermissi-
bly discriminatory or capricious allocations of tax burdens.38 He
was quick to note, however, that in property taxation the classifi-
cation is the real property itself; thus, all real property within a
taxing district must be taxed at substantially the same ratio of
assessed value to market value.39 Therefore, the opinion went on,
invalid as repugnant to the . . . Constitution of this Commonwealth .. any statute
oft] this Commonwealth, or any provision of any home rule charter.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(7) (2009).
33. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1210.
34. Id. (citing Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.'s Tax Assessment, 73 A. 429, 430 (Pa. 1909)).
35. Id. (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. 1985); In re Harleigh
Realty Co., 149 A. 653, 654 (Pa. 1930)).
36. Id. at 1211 (citing Wilson Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 737 A.2d 1215,
1220 (Pa. 1999)).
37. Id. There is a presumption that the Legislature does not mean to abrogate the
Constitutions of the United States or the Commonwealth when passing any statute. 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(3) (2009).
38. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1211.
39. Id. at 1212 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 652 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Pa. 1995)). With regard to taxing property, the need for
uniformity is premised upon "the general principle that taxpayers should pay no more or
less than their proportionate share of government." Id. (quoting Downingtown, 913 A.2d at
199). Unlike under the United States Constitution, which does not call for equality across
sub-classifications, the Pennsylvania Constitution formerly required all property-
commercial, residential, or otherwise-within a taxing district to he taxed at the same ratio
Vol. 48656
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in a case challenging a property tax scheme the court usually
must only concern itself with whether a classification exists be-
cause any difference in tax liability beyond the anticipated prag-
matic disparities will probably be an abrogation of the uniformity
requirement. 40
Whether a property owner asserts that her property was va-
luated at a higher ratio than surrounding properties as a lone
oversight (as before a board of assessment appeals) or that such
valuation was the result of a countywide misassessment pursuant
to faulty statutes, the burden is roughly similar, explained the
court. 41 The opinion stated that because the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution calls for property assessments to be based as closely as
possible on each property's fair market value, a litigating taxpayer
must prove the varying assessments she is challenging as well as
how the differing percentages of assessed value to market value
violate the uniformity requirement.42 The court noted four stan-
dards for showing that an assessment system results in insuffi-
ciently uniform valuations.43
Justice Castille stated that first the established predetermined
ratio ("EPR") is determined by each county and is the percentage
of a property's market value by which the assessed value is ascer-
tained.44 Second, he stated that the State Tax Equalization Board
determines a county's Common Level Ratio ("CLR"), which is the
percentage of assessed value to current market value used gener-
ally in the county. 45 Neither the EPR nor the CLR are ultimately
of assessed value to market value. See McKnight Shopping Ctr. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment,
Appeals & Review, 209 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. 1965). But the court has abandoned such an
approach and allows differently situated property owners to be taxed differently while
maintaining that similarly situated taxpayers may not be taxed differently. Clifton, 969
A.2d at 1212-13 (discussing Downingtown, 913 A.2d at 201).
40. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1213.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1214.
43. Id. at 1214-17.
44. Id. at 1214. EPR is defined as "[tlhe ratio of assessed value to market value estab-
lished by the board of county commissioners and uniformly applied in determining assessed
value in any year." 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5342.1. "[1]n application, the EPR is treated
as a fixed number that merely fractionalizes assessments and which is generally held con-
stant pending county-wide reassessments." Downingtown, 913 A.2d at 202-03 n.13. Alleg-
heny County intends that a property's assessed value is equivalent to its market value, i.e.,
100 percent or an EPR of 100. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1214.
45. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1215. The CLR is calculated by reference to the sales prices of
properties sold in a given year compared to their assessed value, so "a county's CLR will be
70 if the assessed value of properties sold in arms-length sales in a year is 70 [percent] of
the total market value of the properties." Id. at 12 16.
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helpful in determining uniformity, he noted.46  The Court ac-
knowledged that the third standard, the Coefficient of Dispersion
("COD"), is well accepted as a gauge of uniformity, as is the fourth,
the Price Related Differential ("PRD").47 After outlining these
general standards the court turned to the parties' arguments.48
The County first argued that the assessment laws were ration-
ally related to the legitimate governmental interest of the need for
the assessment system to be stable and predictable. 49 The County
maintained that the base year method was rationally related to
this interest because it provided a consistent set of fixed values for
a reasonable length of time.50 Next, the County argued that its
application of an EPR of 100 to all properties in its jurisdiction
satisfied the Uniformity Clause's minimum requirements.51 Also,
contrary to the trial court's determination, the County maintained
that the base year method does respond to market changes be-
cause of the statutory mechanism whereby the County's EPR may
be replaced by its CLR. 52 The County contended that merely be-
cause the base year system does not respond to immediate market
changes does not mean it is unconstitutional. 5 3 Lastly, the County
argued that the system does not lead to the widespread inequities
found by the trial court, which incorrectly relied on the IAAO
standards in making its determination. 5 4
46. Id. at 1216. A CLR of sixty could mean that properties in a county are assessed at
fifty-five to sixty-five percent of their market value, or it could mean that some proper-ties
are assessed at ninety percent while others are assessed at thirty percent, and so the CLR
does not, by itself, establish whether systemic uniformity exists. Id.
47. Id. "The COD is the average deviation from the median, mean, or weighted mean
ratio of assessed value to fair market value, expressed as a percentage of that figure."
Beattie, 907 A.2d at 530 n.7. A higher COD results in a higher variance in assessment
ratios. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1216. A COD should generally not exceed fifteen according to
the LAAO. Id. at 1217. The PRD demonstrates either assessment regressivity, where high-
value properties are appraised at a lower ratio of their actual values than are low-value
properties, or tax progressivity, where appraisals for high-value properties are greater than
low-value properties in relation to their actual values. Id. The former occurs with PRIs
over 1.03 while the latter occurs under 0.98. Id. at 1216.
48. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1217.
49. Id. The system, it was argued, must be stable and predictable because of (1) the
expense of periodic reassessments and (2) municipalities, school districts, and individual
property owners that must budget in advance according to their respective tax incomes or
burdens. Id. at 1217-18.
50. Id. at 1218.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1219.
54. Id. The County also pointed out that its system was adjudged to be more uniform
than some other Pennsylvania counties. Id.
Surnme 2010 Clifton v. Allegheny County65
Appellees replied that the Uniformity Clause requires present
uniformity and is not satisfied if, at some random point in the
past, taxes were uniform.55 They argued that under the base year
system, properties in declining neighborhoods are forced to pay
taxes based on higher past values. 56 Appellees noted the County's
high COD and its PRD of 1.11, which indicates that lower-value
properties are taxed at a higher ratio than other properties, and
argued there is no proper rationalization for such a scheme. 57 Ap-
pellees claimed that, because real property is to be treated as a
single class, there is no legitimate governmental interest advanced
by distinguishing between owners with declining or stagnant
property values and those with increasing values.5 8 Appellees also
disputed the County's assertions regarding the cost of reassess-
ments. 59 Appellees contended that the appeals process cited by
the County is not meant to address systemic non-uniformity and
that such a system may not place the burden on individual tax-
payers to remedy it.60 As for whether the trial court improperly
relied on IAAO standards, appellees noted that the court also used
reports by the County itself as well as a federal report, and that
the studies using the JAAO standards are factual matters undis-
puted by the County.61 Lastly, appellees maintained that the only
constitutional system available requires yearly assessments based
on present market value. 62
The court began its analysis by stating its holding-that the
General County and Second Class County Assessment Laws were
unconstitutional as applied in Allegheny County-and distin-
guishing this holding from that of the trial court, which held the
same statutes facially unconstitutional.63 Having not yet fully
evaluated the standards surrounding facial challenges, nor the
55. Id. at 1220.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1220.
59. Id. at 1220-21. Appellees noted that regular assessments would cost no more than
irregular ones and that the County's numhers regarding the cost of its previous assessment
did not show how much of the cost was used for normal operations and how much was used
for the assessment itself. Id. at 1221.
60. Id. at 1221.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1222. An as-applied challenge is "a claim that a law or go-
vernmental policy, though constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, usu.
because of a discriminatory effect; a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of
a particular case or in its application to a particular party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261
(9th ed. 2009).
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challenger's burden of proof, the court discussed the United States
Supreme Court's recent discussions of these matters.6 Under
even the more relaxed standard of determining whether a statute
has a plainly legitimate sweep, the court found that the trial
court's conclusion that the statutes are facially unconstitutional
fails.65 The court also noted that the statutes allowing for a base
year method could be constitutionally applied in a number of cir-
cumstances; in addition, the presumption of constitutionality, the
challenger's heavy burden, and the plasticity of the statutes in
question prevented the court from affirming the trial court on this
point.66
Chief Justice Castille began addressing the County's arguments
by noting their seeming inconsistency: on the one hand, the Coun-
ty argued that the legitimate state interest it set forth justifies
any classification due to the base year system, which seems to
admit non-uniformity, but on the other hand, the County rejected
non-uniformity by arguing that use of the EPR or CLR adheres to
the Uniformity Clause's proportionality principle.67 The court ad-
dressed the latter argument first. 68 The court noted the undis-
puted evidence that the County's COD and PRD were well outside
the acceptable ranges according to the IAAO. 6 9 Moreover, the un-
deniable expert testimony produced by appellees, showing the
non-uniform changes in market values across the County's muni-
cipalities, demonstrated the serious inequities produced by the
County's base year method, according to the court.70 The trial
court used these findings and fully appreciated that only substan-
64. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1222-23. Particularly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), which required that a "challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [an] Act would be valid." Clifton,
969 A.2d at 1222-23. But more recently the United States Supreme Court seems to have
only required that a challenger show that a substantial number of a statute's applications
are unconstitutional. Id. at 1223 n.36. That is, a facial challenge must fail where a statute
has a "plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 1223 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
65. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1224.
66. Id.
67. Id. That is, the principle that taxpayers should pay only their proportionate share
of the expenses of government, meaning in the property tax area that each property own-
er's tax is based on substantially the same percentage of assessed value to market value as
others in the district. Id.
68. Id. at 1225.
69. Id. The County's COD was 22.3 in 2005 and 30.2 at the time of the opinion. Id. Its
PRD was 1. 10 in 2005 and 1. 12 at the time of the opinion. Id. The court showed the extent
to which property values can change in a non-uniform manner just within one school dis-
trict, to which the base year system, as applied, does not properly respond. Id.
70. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1226.
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tial-and not exact-uniformity was required, and, the opinion
stated, properly concluded that such uniformity was lacking.71
Though the court recognized the IAAO standards, this did not
suggest, as a matter of law, that departure from one of these stan-
dards is determinative for demonstrating lack of uniformity. 72
Therefore, the court reasoned that the County was mistaken to
suggest that use of the standards is improper because they have
not been adopted by the legislature; rather, the standards have
been used only to supply a true-to-life basis upon which the court
may center its judgment that the base year system in Allegheny
County is unconstitutional as applied.73
Next, the court denied the County's argument that uniform ap-
plication of an EPR of 100% met the Uniformity Clause's require-
ments.74 Pointing out the simple fact that application of the same
ratio to the actual values of properties circa 2002, when many of
those properties' market values have significantly changed since
2002, is functionally the same as applying different ratios to cur-
rent actual values, the court held that the base year system failed
to guarantee uniformity over time.75 Similarly, the court held that
use of the CLR via the appeals process is an insufficient method to
correct the widespread inequities inhering in the County's as-
sessment system. 76 The court concluded that the County may not
place the burden on individual taxpayers to fix its constitutionally
infirm method on a case-by-case basis.77 The court also pointed
out that the appeals process does little to increase the assess-
ments of under-assessed properties, because the only way to re-
medy such a problem is for the municipality or school district to
challenge the assessment, and this practice varies greatly from
community to community. 78 Lastly, the court recognized the trial
court's point that if the appeals process was a sufficient corrective
then there would not be dozens of Pennsylvania counties with
overwhelmingly unacceptable CODs. 7 9
The court then turned its attention to the County's argument
that any non-uniformity in its system was justified by a legitimate
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1226-27.
73. Id. at 1227.
74. Id.
75. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1227.
76. Id. at i227-28.
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state interest.80 It held that because impractical inequities in tax-
ation are prohibited by the Uniformity Clause, the County may
not portray the non-uniformity produced by its system's failure to
address market changes as a classification in order to pardon it.81
Even if such a classification were allowed, the court stated that
the County gave no justifiable basis for the distinction between
property owners in lower-value, declining, or stagnant neighbor-
hoods and property owners in higher-value or appreciating
areas.82 Lastly, assuming that such a distinction would be valid,
the court found no logical connection between it and the County's
asserted governmental interests in stability and predictability. 8 3
The court concluded that a base year system is not inherently
unconstitutional, but that it will only become unconstitutional
over time.84 The court refused to state definitively when that
point occurs because real estate factors vary from county to coun-
ty.85 Rather, the court found that the General Assembly must
craft a more thoroughly constitutional scheme. 86 The court re-
manded the case to the trial court to direct the County in conduct-
ing a reassessment.8 17
B. Justice Baer's Concurrence
Justice Baer filed a concurring opinion disagreeing with the ma-
jority to the extent that it refused to announce a constitutional
limit for reassessments where the legislature did not announce
one.881 He faulted the majority for not determining when a pre-
sumption should arise that a county's base year system has be-
come unconstitutional as applied.89 He opined that this refusal
will leave the taxing authorities and property owners of the Com-
monwealth in the dark as to what is and what is not unconstitu-
80. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1228.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1228-29.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1229.
86. Id. Pennsylvania is the only state where the assessment laws permit use of a base
year indefinitely. Id at 1231. Twenty-two states require yearly reassessments and twenty-
six require reassessments though allow for more than one year to pass. Id. The court
noted that the General Assembly may consult what other states do as well as refer to the
IAAO standards used in the opinion. Id.
87. Id. at 1231. The trial court was to set a timeframe for the County to reassess. Id.
88. Id. (Baer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1232.
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tional.90 Furthermore, he concluded that such uncertainty will
lead to interminable litigation and probably to varying findings in
the courts of common pleas. 91 Justice Baer maintained that the
test the majority should have adopted is the COD, which the
IAAO upholds as the most useful gauge of uniformity and which
has been an uncontested guide since 1980.92
IV. THE PRECEDENT LEADING TO CLIFTON
One hundred years and one month prior to its opinion in Clif-
ton, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicated the requirements
of the Uniformity Clause for purposes of property taxation. 93 In
Delaware, L. & W R., the appellants had complained that the trial
court erred by including the value of personal property in its de-
termination of the assessed value of appellants' coal lands. 94 Be-
cause the trial court and counsel agreed upon a method where,
first, the ratio of assessed to actual value of nearby real estate
would be ascertained, then, second, the actual value of appellants'
coal lands would be determined, and, third, the same ratio ap-
plied, the court could not then abandon this method by including
the personal property in its valuation.95 The court concluded that
different uses of real property-farming, manufacturing, or dwel-
ling-could not be assessed at different rates because taxation
90. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1232 (Baer, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1234. Justice Baer also faulted the majority for not exercising its responsibil-
ity to supply a constitutional framework for determining violations of the Uniformity
Clause. Id. at 1233. He cited cases for precedent that courts may act in areas where the
legislature has not. Id. at 1233-34 (discussing, inter alia, Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct.
1231 (2009); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Commonwealth v. Miller,
888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005)). Justice Baer interpreted these cases for the proposition that the
court should not, "in the guise of judicial restraint, abdicate our fundamental responsibility
to provide a proper framework for the assessment of actual constitutional violations." Id. at
1234. The majority took issue with the concurrence's interpretation of the cases discussed,
finding them inapposite to the case sub judice. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1229 n.44 (majority
opinion). The majority also justified its refusal to adopt a test on the grounds that neither
party had argued for the specific measure advocated by the concurrence and noted that its
opinion is sufficient to give the General Assembly notice that it must act to remedy the
assessment laws to withstand constitutional attack. Id.
93. Delaware, L. & W R., 73 A. at 430. The court in Clifton quoted the opinion at
length to describe the requirements of the Uniformity Clause. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1210
(quoting Delaware, L. & W R.R., 73 A. at 430).
94. Delaware, L. & W R., 73 A. at 431.
95. Id.
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must be the same upon the same class of subjects and all real es-
tate is part of the same subject class.96
Half a century later, the court decided Narehood v. Pearson,97
where taxpayers alleged that a recent countywide assessment was
unconstitutional because the chief assessor failed to follow certain
provisions of the assessment law and because the assessments
were determined by a base method.98 The court quickly dismissed
the taxpayer's complaints regarding the technical aspects of the
assessment law, holding that the assessor's actions were as near
the letter of the statute as practically possible. 99 As for the tax-
payers' averments regarding the impermissibility of the mode
whereby the county fixed a certain dollar amount per acre of sur-
face land, mineral land, or farm land and then based its assess-
ments off of this figure, the court noted that the taxpayers failed
to assert that the fixed prices were irrational or more than market
value.100 The court allowed for classification based upon various
types of real property and different modes of assessment for each
type, and it also held that assessors did not need to be personally
familiar with every single parcel to assign values. 101
The taxpayers' most significant argument was that the asses-
sors' failure to value each property at its actual market value, in-
cluding the amenities of each property, was unconstitutional. 1 0 2
Referring to the practice in cities whereby a certain value is ap-
plied to each square foot in a given block and adjusted according to
any number of variables; the court held that the reasonable appli-
cation of a uniform value per acre of farm, surface, or mineral land
did not violate the Uniformity Clause. 03 The opinion noted that
96. Id. at 432. The court then reversed and remitted to the trial court to find the prop-
er ratio sans personal property. Id.
97. 96 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1953).
98. Narehood, 96 A.2d at 896.
99. Id. at 897. The taxpayers failed to consider the timing of their complaint, in that
the assessment laws had been recently revised in 1952; thus, the assessing officers did not
have time, nor were they required, to follow every provision to the letter. Id. If technical
irregularities persist, the court noted, the taxpayers had opportunity to appeal to the local
Board. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Hammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 92 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1952)). Though
the court in Clifton affirmed its earlier holding that real property must be treated as a
single class, it noted that distinctions may he constitutional in certain situations. Clifton,
969 A.2d at 1220. The appellees in Clifton acknowledged this aspect of Narehood as well,
but also realized such an issue was not present in Allegheny County, where the only classi-
fication was between declining or stagnant properties and those with increasing values,
which is not a legitimate classification. Id.
102. Narewood, 96 A.2d at 898.
103. Id.
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the fact that taxpayers could appeal to the Board regarding any
alleged oversight or mistake solidified the constitutionality of the
assessors' methods.10 4 The court stated that the adoption of a base
standard of value for properties within the same class was a con-
stitutional method since substantial uniformity is all that is re-
quired. 10 5  The court dismissed the taxpayers' complaint, refusing
to exercise equity jurisdiction where there was an adequate reme-
dy at law. 106
Five years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to ad-
dress the issue of uniformity again when a property owner's build-
ing was assessed at 91.9% of its market value while other similar
properties were assessed at 40% to 57% of their market values. 107
The city in Brooks Building had no predetermined ratio that it
applied generally to property within the building's class. 08 Be-
cause the Superior Court had previously held that if no generally
applied ratio could be demonstrated by the complaining taxpayer,
then the actual value was conclusive in assessment appeals, the
trial court regretfully refused to help the taxpayer. 109
This rule-that in order to prove a lack of uniformity, the tax-
payer had to show a fixed ratio from which the taxing authority
departed-was quickly repudiated by the court. 110 Rather, the
104. Id.
105. Id. at 899. Allegheny County seized upon this statement in its argument in Clifton.
Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1218. This proof-text was inapposite to the court's decision, however,
because unlike the assessors in Narehood, the County's de facto classification had no rea-
sonable justification. Id. at 1229. Counsel for the taxpayers in Clifton also paid attention
to Narehood, particularly its discussion and approval of Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of
Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23 (1931). Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1220. The taxpayers
were able to mine a point of law from Cumberland Coal that was readily applicable to the
facts of the case, namely that "[aipplying the same ratio to the same assigned values, when
the actual values differ, creates the same disparity in effect as applying a different ratio to
actual values when the latter are the same."' C'lifton, 969 A.2d at 1221.
106. Narewood, 96 A.2d at 900.
107. In re Brooks Bldg., 137 A.2d 273, 274 (Pa. 1958).
108. Brooks Bldg., 137 A.2d at 274.
109. Id. at 274-75. The trial court recognized that such a rule placed an unfair burden
on the taxpayer, namely, to show the value of every other property in the taxing district in
order to establish a general ratio of assessed to actual value. Id. at 274. The court later
reiterated in Deitch Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 209 A.2d 397 (Pa.
1965), that while a taxpayer should probably only offer evidence of properties of a similar
nature in order to show his property's market value, he may reference any property within
the taxing district in order to establish whether uniformity of taxation is present. Deitch,
209 A.2d at 402. Because all real estate is a class, any property is considered a comparable
for purposes of showing uniformity in the applied tax rate, no matter its market value in
relation to the market value of the property in question. Id.; accord McKnight Shopping
Ctr., 209 A.2d at 393.
110. Brooks Bldg., 137 A.2d at 275. The court considered such a rule "unjust and ridi-
culous." Id.
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court maintained that the Uniformity Clause required that prop-
erties must be assessed at no more than their market values, nor
may they be assessed at a percentage higher than that fixed in the
district."1 ' Also precluded was methodical under-valuation of
comparable properties. 112
The city also argued that because the assessment of the proper-
ty in question was less than its market value there was no injury,
nor violation of uniformity. 113 Citing Cumberland Coal, the court
held that when the requirement of a statute and the requirement
of uniformity cannot both be met, the latter must prevail over the
former. 114 Thus, even if the statute requires assessment at a cer-
tain percentage of market value, that ratio may not be applied if it
would lead to non-uniformity as to the property in question, as
compared to similarly situated properties. 15
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed the Uniformity
Clause outside of the property tax realm in Leonard v. Thorn-
butrgh,116 where it reversed the Commonwealth Court's opinion,
which held that a Philadelphia wage tax statute violated the Un-
iformity Clause because it applied different rates to residents and
non-residents. 117 The appellee argued that the Uniformity Clause,
and not the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution
applied to the case, but the court replied that violations of either
clause are analyzed similarly. 1 18 The court noted the broad discre-
tion of the legislature in making classifications for taxing purposes
and that taxpayers seeking to invalidate a taxing statute bear a
heavy burden."19 Where a classification is attacked, the court em-
phasized, it will be upheld if it is premised on a justifiable distinc-
tion that supplies a reasonable foundation for disparate treat-
111. Id (citing Cumberland Coal, 284 U.S. at 28 (1931)).
112. Id (citing Cumberland Coal, 284 U.S. at 28 (1931)).
113. Id. at 276.
114. Id. (citing Cumberland Coal, 284 U.S. at 28-29 (1931) (quoting Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923))).
115. Brooks Bldg., 137 A.2d at 276. Accord Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires "the
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property
owners").
116. 489 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 1985).
117. Leonard, 489 A.2d at 1351.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court stated "tax legislation will not he declared unconstitutional unless it
'clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution."' Id. at 1351 (quoting Common-
wealth v. Life Assurance Co. of Pa., 214 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. 1965), appeal dismissed, 384
U.S. 268 (1966)).
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ment.120 Thus, the court reasoned, if the taxing scheme places
unequal burdens on similarly situated persons, it will be deemed
unconstitutional. 121 Unlike the illegitimate classification in Clif-
ton, the classification in Leonard was upheld because it reasona-
bly distinguished between residents who have twenty-four-hour
access to public services and substantial political representation in
city matters, and non-residents, who do not. 122
In addition to the requirements of the Uniformity Clause, the
court has been faced with the issue of whether it could exercise
equity jurisdiction when an assessment statute that purportedly
provided a legal remedy was constitutionally challenged. 123 In
Borough of Green Tree, a municipality and several taxpayers chal-
lenged provisions of the state assessment laws which allowed Al-
legheny County to conduct triennial assessments. 124 Before the
parties could argue the case on the merits, the trial court raised
the question of jurisdiction because the assessment law provided a
statutory appeal procedure. 125  Finding it could not exercise
equitable jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the case. 12 6
Upon appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first had to re-
concile two previous holdings--one allowing equity jurisdiction
where a taxing statute is attacked on constitutional grounds, the
other requiring, in addition, the absence of a statutory remedy.127
The court reconciled the opposing viewpoints by mainly siding
with the latter, while recognizing an exception where a statutory
remedy technically exists, but is inadequate or pointless. 128
120. Id. at 1352.
121. Id.
122. Leonard, 489 A.2d at 1352-53.
123. Borough of Green Tree v. Bd. of Prop. Assessments, Appeals & Review, 328 A.2d
819 (Pa. 1974).
124. Borough of Green Tree, 328 A.2d at 820. These provisions allowed the County to
reassess one of the three triennial districts one year after assessment was made for the
county as a whole. Id. The second and third districts were reassessed in the second and
third years after the assessment, to be applied for the following three years in each case.
Id.
125. Id. at 821. The assessment law in question was the Second Class County Assess-
ment Law. Id.; see supra note 1.
126. Id. Some of the plaintiffs appealed from dismissal of their equity complaint to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which redirected the appeal to the Commonwealth Court,
which affirmed the trial court. Id. A few of the plaintiffs continued to press the issue and
were subsequently granted allocatur by the Supreme Court. Id.
127. Id. The former case, Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., 244 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1968),
seemed to have a less stringent view of equity jurisdiction. Borough of Green Three, 328
A.2d at 822. The other case, Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Indiana County Bd. of
Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 266 A.2d 78 (Pa. 1970), required the absence of a statuto-
ry remedy. Borough of Green Tree, 328 A.2d at 822.
128. Id. at 823.
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Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's decision because
the taxpayers' complaint-that the provision allowing triennial
assessments was unconstitutional--could not be effectively adju-
dicated by appeal to the Board of Assessments.129
This rule regarding equity jurisdiction was implemented several
times by the Commonwealth Court in property tax assessment
cases.130 Each case began with a challenge to the assessment me-
thods of the given county and ended with that county being or-
dered to conduct a countywide reassessment. 1 3 1 The challenges
cited various flaws in the counties' methods: subjectively chang-
ing building grades without considering structural changes since
the previous assessment, 132 choosing to only reassess certain dis-
tricts while varying the methods of assessment therein, 133 using
outdated guidelines, 134 and reassessing certain properties by
merely doubling their value without taking into account the type
of real estate involved.135
The Commonwealth Court noted that the mere passage of time
is insufficient to render a taxing scheme violative of the Uniformi-
ty Clause, and that other factors are necessary. 136 The other fac-
tors, the court noted, include the objective statistical indicators of
uniformity such as the COD, the specificity of procedural guide-
lines, and the discriminatory effect of the scheme. 137 The presence
of a high COD played a key role in each of the cases, 138 but the
129. Borough of Green Tree, 328 A.2d at 825. The court noted its prior opinions indi-
cated that "the more direct the attack on the statute, the more likely it is that exercise of
equitable jurisdiction will not damage the role of the administrative agency charged with
enforcement of the act." Id.
130. See Miilcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. County of Erie, 714 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998); Ackerman v. Carbon County, 703 A.2d 82 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); City of Harrisburg
v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 677 A.2d 350 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); City
of Lancaster v. County of Lancaster, 599 A.2d 289 (Pa. Commw. Ct., appeal denied, 606
A.2d 903 (Pa. 1992) ("To force every aggrieved taxpayer to assume the task of appealing,
when the larger question can be expeditiously and efficiently resolved in a single action,
would be unnecessarily burdensome on both property owners and the judicial system.").
131. Milicreek Twp., 714 A.2d at 1109; Ackerman, 703 A.2d at 84; City of Harrisburg,
677 A.2d at 356; City of Lancaster, 599 A.2d at 301.
132. City of Lancaster, 599 A. 2d at 296.
133. Id. at 299.
134. Milicreek Twp., 714 A.2d at 1099.
135. City of Harrisburg, 677 A.2d at 355.
136. Millcreek Twp., 714 A.2d at 1098.
137. Id. at 1098-99.
138. See Milicreek Twp., 714 A.2d at 1107-08; Ackerman, 703 A.2d at 87; City of Harris-
burg, 677 A.2d at 355; City of Lancaster, 599 A.2d at 296-97.
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court never suggested that this factor alone would be sufficient to
establish non-uniformity. 139
More recently, in Beattie v. Allegheny County, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had to address whether equity jurisdiction may be
properly exercised where a taxing statute is not facially chal-
lenged but challenged as applied, and where the challengers did
not exhaust administrative remedies.140 A class of taxpayers chal-
lenged the County's assessment system for over-assessing lower-
value properties and under-assessing higher-value properties. 141
The trial court in Beattie refused to exercise equity jurisdic-
tion. 42 Similarly, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the County's argument that non-
facial challenges had not been traditionally considered substantial
enough for equity jurisdiction. 4 3 But it also recognized that the
Commonwealth Court had exercised such jurisdiction in City of
Lancaster, City of Harrisburg, Ackerman, and Milicreek Town-
ship.'44 The court, in effect, approved Ackerman and Milicreek
Township, in that it recognized that there are times-eg., when
inequalities are strongly suspected to be pervasive and the general
taxing picture to be non-uniform-that a court may exercise
equitable jurisdiction, even in the absence of a facial challenge. 45
Though those cases were factually distinguishable, the court noted
that the relative newness of Allegheny County's assessment did
not prove that it was uniform, because there may have been de-
fects in the system used to determine the assessment. 46 Though
139. Milicreek Twp., 714 A.2d at 1109 n.16. The court noted "there is no specific requi-
site level of statistical information for cases of this type and we note the many other factors
which necessitate a countywide reassessment throughout this opinion." Id.
140. Beattie v.Allegheny County, 907 A.2d 519, 520 (Pa. 2006).
141. Beattie, 907 A.2d at 520. Such a system, if proven, would reflect tax regressivity
and would be indicated by a PRD over 1.03. See supra note 47.
142. Beattie, 907 A.2d at 522. Following Borough of Green Tree. supra note 121, the
taxpayers argued that their complaint raised Uniformity Clause and Equal Protection
issues and that administrative remedies were insufficient; on the other hand, the County
argued such constitutional challenges must be facial and that, because any relevant evi-
dence must be admitted in the administrative appeal, the taxpayers had a statutory reme-
dy. Id. at 525-26. The Court noted that the rule requiring administrative exhaustion is
judge-made and does not affect the existence of equity jurisdiction but only whether it may
be properly exercised. Id. at 526 n.5.
143. Id. at 527.
144. Id. at 528. The court distinguished the cases, because, in contrast to the first two,
no particular group had been deliberately treated differently in Beattie, and in contrast to
the last two, Allegheny County's latest assessment was of recent vintage. Id.
145. Id. at 528.
146. Id.. Both sides recognized the importance of Borough of Green Tree and shaped
their arguments accordingly; however, the court asserted that that case '"did not purport to
lay down a per se rule precluding [equity] jurisdiction absent a facial challenge to the go-
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equity jurisdiction may be used to hear a complaint issuing an as-
applied challenge, the court refused it to the appellant class in
Beattie because of the weakness of its pleadings and the vague-
ness of the relief sought.147
V. THE EFFECT OF CLIFTON
The Clifton court's decision to hold Allegheny County's assess-
ment system unconstitutional as applied rather than facially con-
stitutional is laudable and correct, but may prove to be incom-
plete. The court properly disagreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion that the provisions allowing a base year method were facially
unconstitutional. 1 4 8 There are, in theory, if not in fact, ways that
a base year system could be constitutionally applied. 1 49 The
court's concluding language does tend to put other counties on no-
tice-particularly those that have not conducted a reassessment in
decades-that their use of the base year method will likely be
found unconstitutional upon challenge by taxpayers. 5 0
Nonetheless, the court could have, and ought to have, set firmer
guidelines for determining when an assessment scheme has led to
impermissibly non-uniform taxing burdens. In this way, the
court's opinion is incomplete, as indicated by Justice Baer's con-
curring opinion.151 The concurrence faulted the majority for not
adopting a test which would raise a presumption of non-
uniformity once a certain level is met. 152 Because the COD has
been judicially applied, is readily available, and has withstood the
test of time, Justice Baer suggested that once a COD of twenty is
found, such a presumption should arise. 53 He maintained that
failure to adopt such a measure would result in uncertainty for
counties and lower courts alike, and would lead to wasted re-
sources, both monetary and judicial. 54 Justice Baer marshaled
authority for the proposition that setting such a standard is a
veining statute,' but instead 'left room for equity jurisdiction in other settings in which
requiring adherence to the statutory avenue would be of little benefit."' Id. at 529 (quoting
Kowenboven v. Allegheny County, 901 A.2d 1003, 1010 (Pa. 2006)).
147. Beattie, 907 A.2d at 529-30.
148. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1222.
149. Id. at 1224 (listing examples of how a base year method could he utilized in a way
that ensures uniformity).
150. Id. at 1229 ('[1t is only through the passage of time that a base year assessment
will become stale, and thus unconstitutional.").
151. Id. at 1231 (Baer, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1232.
153. Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1235 (Baer, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1232-33.
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proper move for the judiciary to take in the absence of legislative
action. 155
Chief Justice Castille's opinion addressed the concurrence in an
extensive footnote, primarily distinguishing the cases used by Jus-
tice Baer as inapplicable to the present case.156 The majority also
reasoned that the parties did not ask for a specific measure to be
adopted and that it was not the court's place to surmise whether
the General Assembly would actually act upon its opinion or
not.157 In this argument the majority neglects to give due weight
to the reality that it had in fact used, and affirmed the trial court's
use of, the very standard advocated by the concurrence. Moreover,
simply because the taxpayers failed to explicitly request that a
specific standard be adopted does not nullify their implicit argu-
ment that a COD over twenty should indicate unconstitutional
non-uniformity, or at least lead to a presumption of such.
The majority's opinion would not be incomplete in this regard if
it were not for the egregious and widespread shortcomings of the
Commonwealth's assessment system. 58 With due respect to the
importance of judicial restraint, it is difficult to see how setting a
judicial presumption that a COD of twenty indicates non-
uniformity would impede the legislature's function in addressing
the broken assessment system in the interim. The failure to adopt
such a presumption seems to rob the court's opinion of any sense
of urgency. This is unfortunate, given its finding that the assess-
ment laws as applied in Allegheny County, and presumably in
other counties, tend to harm lower-value property owners the
most.
VI. CONCLUSION
Subsequent to the court's decision, the County sought a stay of
the remand to the trial court which the court denied. 159 Because
the issue presented in Clifton was really statewide there were
155. Id. at 1233-34.
156. Id. at 1229 n.44 (majority opinion).
157. Id.
158. As alluded to in the main opinion, the trial court's survey of the assessment laws of
all fifty states reveals that, besides Delaware, every other state requires that assessments
be "based on current or relatively current market values," and most set a specified number
of years in which a reassessment must occur. Clifton v. Allegheny County, No. GDO5-
028638, 2007 Pa. Dist. & Cnity. Dec. LEXIS 202, at *77 (Ct. Coin. P1. Allegheny June 6,
2007). Nearly all states have implemented a state oversight board to ensure their counties
maintain proper assessments. Id.
159. Clifton v. Allegheny County, 980 A.2d 27 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam order).
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good arguments for granting the stay. 60 Nonetheless, the court
redeemed its failure to adopt the aforementioned presumption by
requiring Allegheny County to proceed under its prior order. In a
state where the refusal to reassess is seen as a badge of honor for
county officials, or, worse, as a prerequisite to election, it is impor-
tant for the Court to maintain its stance that Allegheny County's
system is unacceptable. If for no other reason, such resolve will
hopefully expedite the legislature's addressing of the Common-
wealth's arcane system. Although Allegheny County should not
have to conduct its third reassessment since 2001 (and possibly a
fourth after legislative reform) while its neighbors have gone dec-
ades without assessing, the court has done an admirable job of
construing the constitutional requirement of uniformity and its
Clifton holding, while less urgent than it might have been, has
shown signs of sparking legislative reform of the broken property
assessment system.16'
Darren M Belajac
160. Clifton, 980 A.2d at 212 (per curium order) (Baer, J., dissenting). Justice Baer
argued that by denying the stay the Court went against its own conclusion to give the legis-
lature time to act. Id. at 213. He maintained that a stay would prevent unnecessary costs
in litigation and reassessments for both Allegheny County as well as taxpayers and gov-
ernments in other Pennsylvania counties. Id. He found that granting a stay was an ac-
ceptable method in Pennsylvania's jurisprudence. Id. at 214-15. The dissent also took
notice of the legislature's recent adoption of a resolution to study the assessment schemes
of other states as well as its consideration of a moratorium on all court-ordered reassess-
ments. Id. at 216. As to this latter possibility, he noted that serious separation of powers
issues may result from a legislative moratorium on a judicial order. Clifton, 980 A.2d at
216.
161. The Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted a resolution to study the
Commonwealth's broken system and "compare it to real property tax systems of other
states, including specifically the real property tax reassessment systems of Maryland and
California, and identify measures to make the Pennsylvania system more uniform, trans-
parent, cost effective and acceptable to the taxpayer.."H.R. Res. 334, 2009-10 Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2009). Moreover, the House has passed a bill that would impose a temporary morato-
rium on court-ordered reassessments. H.R.B. 1661, 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). The
moratorium would last until a study of the Commonwealth's assessment system was con-
ducted and implemented or until June 30. 2011. whichever comes first. Id. The Senate has
not yet voted on the bill, though the Finance Committee has approved it. The Pennsylva-
nia General Assembly,
http://www.legis. state. pa. uscfdocsfbillinfofbill history.cfm? syear2009& sind=O&body=H&t
ype=B&bn=1661 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
